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Abstract
In this paper we study the concurrent cops and robber (CCCR) game. CCCR follows the same rules as
the classical, turn-based game, except for the fact that the players move simultaneously. The cops’ goal is to
capture the robber and the concurrent cop number of a graph is defined the minimum number of cops which
guarantees capture. For the variant in which it it required to capture the robber in the shortest possible time,
we let time to capture be the payoff function of CCCR; the (game theoretic) value of CCCR is the optimal
capture time and (cop and robber) time optimal strategies are the ones which achieve the value. In this paper
we prove the following.
1. For every graph G, the concurrent cop number is equal to the “classical” cop number.
2. For every graph G, CCCR has a value, the cops have an optimal strategy and, for every ε > 0, the
robber has an ε-optimal strategy.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the concurrent cops and robber (CCCR) game. In the classical CR game [17, 18] each
player observes the other player’s move before he performs his own. On the other hand, in concurrent CR the
players move simultaneously. In all other aspects, the concurrent game (henceforth CCCR) follows the same
rules as the classical, turn-based game (henceforth TBCR).
The CCCR game (similarly to TBCR) can be considered as either a game of kind (the cops’ goal is to capture
the robber) or a game of degree (the cops’ goal is to capture the robber in the shortest possible time)1.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define preliminary concepts and notation and use these
to define the CCCR game rigorously. In Section 3 we concentrate on the “game of kind” aspect: we define the
concurrent cop number c˜ (G) and prove that, for every graph G, it is equal to the “classical” cop number c (G).
In Section 4 we concentrate on the “game of degree” aspect: we equip CCCR with a payoff function (namely
the time required to capture the robber) and prove that (a) CCCR has a game theoretic value, (b) the cops
have an optimal strategy and (c) for every ε > 0 the robber has an ε-optimal strategy; in addition we provide
an algorithm for the computation of the value and the optimal strategies. In Section 5 we discuss related work.
Finally, in Section 6 we present our conclusions and future research directions.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, as well as in the rest of the paper, we will mainly concern ourselves with the case of a single cop;
this is reflected in the following definitions and notation. In case K > 1 cops are considered, this will be stated
explicitly; the extension of definitions and notation is straightforward.
2.1 Definition of the CCCR Game
Both CCCR and TBCR are played on an undirected, simple and connected graph G = (V,E) by two players
called C and R. Player C, controlling K cops (with K ≥ 1) pursues a single robber controlled by player R (we
will sometimes call both the cops and robber tokens). We assume the reader is familiar with the rules of TBCR
and proceed to present the rules of CCCR for the case of K = 1 (a single cop).
1This terminology is due to Isaacs [9].
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1. The game starts from given initial positions: the cop is located at x0 ∈ V and the robber at y0 ∈ V .
2. At the t-th round (t ∈ N) C moves the cop to xt ∈ N [xt−1] and simultaneously R moves the robber to
yt ∈ N [yt−1]2.
3. At every round both players know the current cop and robber location (and remember all past locations).
4. A capture occurs at the smallest t ∈ N for which either of the following conditions holds:
(a) The cop is located at xt, the robber is located at yt, and xt = yt. This capture condition is the same
as in TBCR.
(b) The cop is located at xt−1 and moves to yt−1, while the robber is located at yt−1 and moves to xt−1.
We will call this “en passant” capture; it does not have an analog in TBCR.
5. C wins if capture takes place for some t ∈ N. Otherwise, R wins. The game analysis becomes easier if
we assume that the game always lasts an infinite number of rounds; if a capture occurs at tc, then we will
have xt = yt = xtc for all t ≥ tc.
We will denote the above defined game, played on graph G = (V,E) and starting from initial position
(x, y) ∈ V 2 by ΓG(x,y). In case the game is played with K cops, it will be denoted by Γ
G,K
(x,y) (in this case x ∈ V
K).
2.2 Nomenclature and Notation
The following quantities will be used in the subsequent analysis (once again, we present definitions for the case
of K = 1). Some of them require two separate definitions: one for TBCR and another for CCCR.
Definition 2.1 A position in TBCR is a triple (x, y, P ) where x ∈ V is the cop location, y ∈ V is the robber
location and P ∈ {C,R} is the player whose turn it is to move. We also have |V |+ 1 additional positions:
1. the position (∅, ∅, C) corresponds to the beginning of the game, before either player has placed his token;
2. the positions (x, ∅, R), x ∈ V , correspond to the phase of the game in which C has placed the cop but R has
not placed the robber.
The set of all TBCR positions is denoted by S = V × V × {C,R}.
Definition 2.2 A position in CCCR is a pair (x˜, y˜) where x˜ ∈ V is the cop location and y˜ ∈ V is the robber
location. The set of all CCCR positions is denoted by S˜ = V × V .
Definition 2.3 A history is a position sequence of finite or infinite length. The set of all game histories of any
finite length is denoted by S∗ for TBCR and S˜∗ for CCCR. The set of all infinite game histories is denoted by
S∞ for TBCR and S˜∞ for CCCR.
In both TBCR and CCCR, the players’ moves are graph nodes, e.g., x, y ∈ V . Given the next move (in
TBCR) or moves (in CCCR) the next game position is determined by the transition function, which encodes the
rules of the respective game.
Definition 2.4 In TBCR, the transition function Q : S × V → S is defined as follows:
when x = y : Q ((x, y, C) , x′) = (x, x,R)
when x 6= y and x′ ∈ N [x] : Q ((x, y, C) , x′) = (x′, y, R)
when x 6= y and x′ /∈ N [x] : Q ((x, y, C) , x′) = (x, y,R)
when x = y : Q ((x, y,R) , y′) = (x, x, C)
when x 6= y and y′ ∈ N [y] : Q ((x, y,R) , y′) = (x, y′, C)
when x 6= y and y′ /∈ N [y] : Q ((x, y,R) , y′) = (x, y, C)
2N [u] denotes the closed neighborhood of node u, i.e., the set containing u itself and all nodes connected to u by an edge.
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Definition 2.5 In CCCR, the transition function Q˜ : S˜ × V × V → S˜ is defined as follows:
when x = y : Q˜ ((x, y) , x′, y′) = (x, x)
when x 6= y and x′ ∈ N [x] and y′ ∈ N [y]
if x′ = y and y′ = x : Q˜ ((x, y) , x′, y′) = (x′, x′)
otherwise : Q˜ ((x, y) , x′, y′) = (x′, y′)
when x 6= y and x′ /∈ N [x] and y′ ∈ N [y] : Q˜ ((x, y) , x′, y′) = (x, y′)
when x 6= y and x′ ∈ N [x] and y′ /∈ N [y] : Q˜ ((x, y) , x′, y′) = (x′, y)
when x 6= y and x′ /∈ N [x] and y′ /∈ N [y] : Q˜ ((x, y) , x′, y′) = (x, y)
The above rules have the following consequences (which will facilitate our subsequent analysis).
1. The CR game continues for an infinite number of rounds; but if a capture occurs at some time tc, the cop
and robber locations remain fixed for all subsequent times.
2. The transition function accepts “illegal” moves (e.g., x′ /∈ N [x]) as input but “ignores” them, in the sense
that they have no influence on the location of tokens.
Roughly speaking, a strategy is a rule which, given a game history, prescribes a player’s next move. In CCCR
the players gain an advantage by using randomized or mixed strategies.
Definition 2.6 A randomized or mixed strategy is a function pi : S˜∗ × V → [0, 1], which satisfies
∀ ((x˜0, y˜0) , (x˜1, y˜1) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) ∈ S˜
∗ :
∑
z˜∈V
pi (z˜| (x˜0, y˜0) , (x˜1, y˜1) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) = 1
and gives the probability that at time t the player moves into node z˜, given that the game has started at position
(x˜0, y˜0) and progressed through positions (x˜1, y˜1) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t).
Two classes of strategies will be of special interest to us.
Definition 2.7 A strategy pi is called memoryless iff
∀ ((x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) ∈ S˜
∗, ∀z˜ ∈ V : pi (z˜| (x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) = pi (z˜| (x˜t, y˜t)) ,
i.e., the player’s move depends only on the current game position.
Definition 2.8 A strategy pi is called deterministic iff
∀ ((x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) ∈ S˜ : ∃z˜ : pi (z˜| (x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) = 1,
i.e., for every game history (x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t), there is a position z˜ to which the player will move with certainty.
If pi is deterministic, it can be equivalently described by a function σ˜ : S˜∗ → V which is determined by pi as
follows:
σ˜ ((x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) = z˜ iff pi (z˜| (x˜0, y˜0) , ..., (x˜t, y˜t)) = 1.
Similarly, if pi is memoryless and deterministic, it can be equivalently described by a function σ˜ : S˜ → V which
is determined by pi as follows:
σ˜ (x˜t, y˜t) = z iff pi (z˜| (x˜t, y˜t)) = 1.
The above definitions and remarks concern CCCR strategies. Regarding TBCR strategies, it is well known
[8] that both players lose nothing by restricting themselves to memoryless deterministic strategies of the form
σ : S → V . In other words, if player P uses the strategy σ and the current game position is (x, y, P ) (which
means that it is P ’s turn to move) P moves his token into node σ (x, y, P ). Obviously P will only use σ when
it is his turn to move; hence we can use the notation σC (x, y) when talking about cop strategies and σR (x, y)
when talking about robber strategies. Note that a cop strategy is also defined for the initial position (∅, ∅, C) and
a robber strategy is also defined for the initial positions (x, ∅, R) (for every x ∈ V ).
3
3 Cop Numbers
In the “classical” TBCR game we have the following.
Definition 3.1 The cop number c (G) of a graph G is the minimum number of cops sufficient to capture the
robber when TBCR is played (optimally by both players) on G.
Note that in the above definition optimal play includes optimal initial placement (in the 0-th round) of the
cops and robber on G. On the other hand, in the CCCR game ΓG,K(x0,y0) the initial cops and robber positions are
given (rather than chosen by the players). A reasonable definition of cop number should account for all possible
initial positions. Hence we have the following.
Definition 3.2 The concurrent cop number c˜ (G) of graph G is the minimum number of cops sufficient to ensure
capture with probability one for every initial position (x˜0, y˜0), when CCCR is played (optimally by both players)
on G.
Note also the expression “capture with probability one” in Definition 3.2. This is different from “certain
capture” in the sense that there may exist infinite game histories in which capture does not occur, but the
probability of any such infinite history materializing is zero3.
In what follows, whenever we mention an arbitrary robber (or cop) move sequence y0, y1, y2, ... we assume
that it is a legal move sequence, i.e., for all t we have yt+1 ∈ N [yt]. Also, if capture occurs at time tc, the
robber’s (and cop’s) location remains fixed at yt = ytc , irrespective of the moves ytc+1, ytc+2, ... .
Lemma 3.3 c (G) = 1⇒ c˜ (G) = 1.
Proof. We select an arbitrary graph G with c (G) = 1 and fix it for the rest of the proof. Both TBCR and
CCCR will be played on this G. We let n = |V |, i.e., n is the number of nodes of G.
We will prove the proposition by constructing a (deterministic and memoryless) cop strategy pi#C which
guarantees, for every starting position, CCCR capture with probability 1.
An essential component of pi#C is a deterministic cop strategy σ˜
∗
C , constructed from another deterministic,
memoryless cop strategy σ∗C which guarantees capture in the TBCR game. Since c (G) = 1 we know [8] that
such a σ∗C exists and guarantees capture in at most T rounds, where T depends only on G. Furthermore recall
that we have defined TBCR so that after capture takes place both C and R stay in place. The rest of the proof
will be divided in two parts.
Part 1. Consider the CCCR game and assume that, for every time t, C knows R’s next move (this assumption
will be removed in Part 2). Take an arbitrary starting position s˜0 = (x˜0, y˜0) and suppose that at time t, when
the position is (x˜t, y˜t), C (knowing that R’s next move will be y˜t+1) plays x˜t+1 = σ˜
∗
C (x˜t, y˜t+1) = σ
∗
C (x˜t, y˜t+1).
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Then, for any robber moves y˜1, y˜2, ... in rounds t = 1, 2, ... the sequence of game positions will be:
(x˜0, y˜0) , (x˜1 = σ
∗
C (x˜0, y˜1) , y˜1) , (x˜2 = σ
∗
C (x˜1, y˜2) , y˜2) , ..., (x˜t = σ
∗
C (x˜t−1, y˜t) , y˜t) , ...
We will prove that x˜T = y˜T , i.e., capture results in at most T rounds and this will be true with certainty for any
starting position s˜0 = (x˜0, y˜0) and robber moves y˜1, y˜2, ... thereafter.
To show this, consider a TBCR game in which, at the end of the initial round (t = 0) the position is
(x0, y0, C) = (x˜0, y˜1, C). Further suppose that C uses σ
∗
C and R plays the moves y1, y2, ... with yt = y˜t+1 (for
t = 0, 1, ...). Note that, given y0 = y˜1, and also that y˜1, y˜2, ... are legal robber moves in CCCR, the resulting
robber moves y1, y2, ...in TBCR are also legal. Moreover recall that, for any given starting position (x0, y0), when
the robber moves are y1, y2, ... and C uses σ
∗
C , we get a sequence of cop and robber locations of the following
form:
x0, y0, x1 = σ
∗
C (x0, y0) , y1, x2 = σ
∗
C (x1, y1) , y2, ..., xt = σ
∗
C (xt−1, yt−1) , yt, ...
3This point is further discussed in Section 6.
4Note that σ˜∗
C
is deterministic and only uses two inputs: one is x˜t (from the previous round) ands the other is y˜t+1 (from the
current round). Hence σ˜∗
C
is memoryless in the sense that it only requires knowledge of the immediate past position, but it is also
prescient in the sense that it requires knowledge of the current robber move.
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Given yt = y˜t+1 for t = 0, 1, ..., x0 = x˜0 and that C uses σ
∗
C , we get x1 = σ
∗
C (x0, y0) = σ
∗
C (x˜0, y˜1) = x˜1,
x2 = σ
∗
C (x1, y1) = σ
∗
C (x˜1, y˜2) = x˜2, ..., xt = σ
∗
C (xt−1, yt−1) = σ
∗
C (x˜t−1, y˜t) = x˜t, ... . Thus the resulting
sequence of cop and robber locations in TBCR is:
x˜0, y˜1, x˜1, y˜2, x˜2, y˜3, ..., x˜t, y˜t+1, ... (1)
Since σ∗C guarantees capture by time T in TBCR, we have xT = yT , irrespective of the moves y1, y2, ... . In
fact we will have xT = yT−1, i.e., at most in the first (i.e. cop) phase of round T , C captures R, or else (i.e., if
xT 6= yT−1) R can stay put in this round and then xT 6= yT , which is a contradiction. Since xT = x˜T and yT−1
= y˜T from xT = yT−1 we have x˜T = y˜T .
We conclude that also in the CCCR game, for any starting position s˜0 = (x˜0, y˜0) and subsequent robber
moves y˜1, y˜2, ..., , capture takes place by the T -th round at the latest. We repeat that this holds under the
assumption that: in each round t, C knows R’s next move y˜t+1.
Part 2. In the actual CCCR game C will not know R’s next move y˜t+1; however he can always guess y˜t+1 to
be v. Suppose that, when R is at y˜t, C guesses with uniform probability
1
|N [y˜t]|
that R will move to v ∈ N [y˜t].
Let y˜t+1 be R’s actual move at t+ 1 and ŷt+1 be C’s guess of that move. We have
Pr (ŷt+1 = v|y˜t+1 = v) =
1
|N [y˜t]|
≥
1
n
and
Pr (C guesses R’s move correctly)
= Pr (ŷt+1 = y˜t+1) =
∑
v∈N [y˜t]
Pr (ŷt+1 = v|y˜t+1 = v) Pr (y˜t+1 = v) ≥
1
n
∑
v∈N [y˜t]
Pr (y˜t+1 = v) =
1
n
.
In other words, C guesses correctly R’s next move with probability at least 1
n
. It follows that C guesses correctly
R’s next T moves (and captures R) with probability at least
(
1
n
)T
.
Now we define the following set of CCCR infinite game histories:
∀k ∈ N : Ak =
{
s : s ∈ S˜∞ and R is still free after the first k · T rounds
}
,
A = lim supAk = ∩
∞
m=1 ∪
∞
k=m Ak.
Since Ak+1 ⊆ Ak (for all k ∈ N) we have
A = ∩∞m=1 ∪
∞
k=m Ak = ∩
∞
m=1Am =
{
s : s ∈ S˜∞ and ∀m ∈ N : R is still free after the first m · T rounds
}
.
In other words, A is the set of all CCCR infinite game histories in which R is never captured. Since
∞∑
k=1
Pr (Ak) ≤
∞∑
k=1
(
1−
(
1
n
)T)k
<∞
we have (from the first Borel-Cantelli lemma [3]) that Pr (A) = 0.
To sum up: using the deterministic memoryless strategy σ∗C in conjunction with uniform guessing, we obtain
a randomized memoryless strategy pi#C which guarantees capture with probability one in the CCCR game; thus
c˜ (G) = 1 as claimed.
In case of a graph G with c(G) = K, it is straightforward to extend the previous argument using K cops.
Note however that, at the end of the proof we will know that: if K cops are required to capture the robber in
TBCR, then K cops suffice to capture (with probability one) the robber in CCCR. Hence we have the following.
Lemma 3.4 c (G) = K ⇒ c˜ (G) ≤ K.
Next we show the “reverse” of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.5 c˜ (G) = 1⇒ c (G) = 1.
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Proof. We select an arbitrary graph G with c˜ (G) = 1 and fix it for the rest of the proof. Both TBCR and
CCCR will be played on this G. The Lemma can be stated equivalently as:
c (G) > 1⇒ c˜ (G) > 1
and this is what we will prove.
If c (G) > 1 then there exists a (memoryless and deterministic) winning robber strategy σ∗R for TBCR with
one cop on G. More specifically, σ∗R guarantees that, for every cop starting position x0, the robber will never be
captured.
Choose any x˜0 ∈ V and let y˜0 = σ∗R (x˜0, ∅). Using σ
∗
R, we will construct a CCCR robber strategy σ˜
∗
R such
that: when CCCR (played on G with a single cop) starts from position (x˜0, y˜0) and R uses σ˜
∗
R, the capture
probability is zero. This, clearly, implies that c˜ (G) > 1.
It suffices to define σ˜∗R only for the case when CCCR starts from (x˜0, y˜0), as follows.
1. In round t = 1: y˜1 = y˜0 (R stays put);
2. In rounds t = 2, 3, ..., R plays according to σ∗R . In other words, if x˜t−1 = u and y˜t−1 = v, then
y˜t = σ˜
∗
R(u, v) = σ
∗
R(u, v).
Clearly, σ˜∗R is not strictly memoryless. The move y˜1 = y˜0 depends not only on the game position (x˜0, y˜0) but
also on the fact that this is the first round. However, the part of σ˜∗R used in rounds t ≥ 2 is memoryless.
Suppose that in CCCR (starting from (x˜0, y˜0)) R plays the strategy σ˜
∗
R while C plays any move sequence
x˜1, x˜2, ... . To prove that capture will never occur, consider a TBCR in which R plays the strategy σ
∗
R and C
plays the same move sequence x˜0, x˜1, ... as in CCCR. Since σ
∗
R is winning, capture will never take place in TBCR;
as will be shown, this implies capture will never occur in CCCR either and, since this holds for any x˜1, x˜2, ...,
we will conclude that c˜ (G) > 1.
Let y0, y1, y2... be the robber moves occurring in TBCR, given that R plays σ
∗
R and C plays x˜0, x˜1, .... Let us
use d (u, v) to denote the distance of nodes u, v in G, i.e., the length of shortest path between u and v. Obviously
we have
∀t ≥ 0 : d (x˜t+1, yt) ≥ 1 (2)
(if we had d (x˜t+1, yt) = 0 then σ
∗
R would not be a winning strategy). Furthermore
∀t ≥ 0 : y˜t+1 = yt. (3)
Indeed, y˜1 = y0 by construction and if, for some n, we have y˜n = yn−1, then
y˜n+1 = σ˜
∗
R(x˜n, y˜n) = σ
∗
R(x˜n, yn−1) = yn.
From (2) and (3) follows that
∀t : 1 ≤ d (x˜t, y˜t) . (4)
This almost completes the proof that capture never occurs in CCCR. However, we must also consider the
possibility of an “en passant” capture, i.e., the case x˜t+1 = y˜t and y˜t+1 = x˜t. But this would mean
d (x˜t, yt) = d (x˜t, y˜t+1) = d (x˜t, x˜t) = 0;
in other words, we would have capture in TBCR which contradicts the assumption that σ∗R is a winning robber
strategy. Hence “en passant” capture is also impossible in CCCR. The proof is complete.
It is straightforward to extend the above for the case of c˜ (G) = K and obtain the following.
Lemma 3.6 c˜(G) = K ⇒ c(G) ≤ K.
Now we can prove our main result.
Theorem 3.7 c (G) = K ⇔ c˜ (G) = K.
Proof. Assume that c (G) = K. By Lemma 3.4 we have c (G) = K ⇒ c˜ (G) ≤ K; if c˜ (G) = K ′ < K, then by
Lemma 3.6 we have c(G) ≤ K ′ < K = c (G), which is a contradiction. Thus c (G) = K ⇒ c˜ (G) = K.
Conversely, assume that c˜(G) = K. By Lemma 3.6 we have c˜(G) = K ⇒ c(G) ≤ K; if c(G) = K ′ < K, then
by Lemma 3.4 we have c˜(G) = K ′ < K = c˜ (G), which is a contradiction. Thus c˜(G) = K ⇒ c(G) = K.
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4 Time Optimality
4.1 Existence of Value and Optimal Strategies
Recall that ΓG(x0,y0) denotes the CCCR game played on graph G by a single cop starting at location x0 and a
single robber starting at location y0. We equip Γ
G
(x0,y0)
with a payoff function, defined as follows. First define
the auxiliary function
∀ (x, y) ∈ V 2 : r (x, y) =
{
1 iff x 6= y
0 iff x = y
where x and y are cop and robber locations, respectively. Suppose that for every round of ΓG(x0,y0) in which
the robber remains uncaptured, C pays R one unit of utility and denote by vG(x0,y0) (piC , piR) the total amount
collected by R (obviously it depends on the strategies piC , piR). Then the payoff of Γ
G
(x0,y0)
is
vG(x0,y0) (piC , piR) = E
(
∞∑
t=0
r (xt, yt)
)
where E (·) denotes expected value and, for notational brevity, the dependence of xt, yt on piC , piR has been
suppressed.
Following the terminology of [5], we recognize that CCCR equipped with the above payoff is a positive
stochastic game, R is Player 1 or the Maximizer and C is Player 2 or the Minimizer. These terms reflect the
fact that R (resp. C) chooses piR (resp. piC) to maximize (resp. to minimize) v
G
(x,y) (piC , piR). We always have
sup
piR
inf
p˜iC
vG(x,y) (piC , piR) ≤ inf
p˜iC
sup
piR
vG(x,y) (piC , piR) . (5)
The following is standard game theoretic terminology [5].
Definition 4.1 If we have
inf
piC
sup
p˜iR
vG(x,y) (piC , piR) = sup
piR
inf
piC
vG(x,y) (piC , piR) (6)
then we denote the common quantity of (6) by v̂G(x,y) and call it the value of Γ
G
(x,y).
Definition 4.2 We denote the capture time of G by CT (G) and define it by
CT (G) = max
(x,y)∈V 2
v̂G(x,y).
What is the connection between the ΓG(x,y) for various (x, y) ∈ V
2? It is natural to assume that if at some
stage of ΓG(x,y) we reach the position (x
′, y′) then we can play the remaining portion of ΓG(x,y) as if we are just
starting the game ΓG(x′,y′). This plausible assumption can be proved rigorously (see [20] and [5, pp.89-91]) and
has the important consequence that, for a given G, v̂G(x,y) is the same for every game Γ
G
(x′,y′) (and hence it is
correct to omit mention of a specific game in the notations vG(x,y) (piC , piR) and v̂
G
(x,y)). An additional important
consequence is the existence of memoryless optimal strategies which are the same for all ΓG(x,y) games, as will be
seen in Theorem 4.4. Before stating and proving this theorem we need some additional definitions.
Definition 4.3 Given ε ≥ 0, we say that the cop strategy piεC is ε-optimal (for the game Γ
G
(x,y)) iff∣∣∣∣v̂G(x,y) − sup
p˜iR
vG(x,y) (pi
ε
C , piR)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Similarly, we say that the robber strategy piεR is ε-optimal (for the game Γ
G
(x,y)) iff∣∣∣∣v̂G(x,y) − inf
piC
vG(x,y) (piC , pi
ε
R)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
A 0-optimal (cop or robber) strategy is simply called optimal.
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If both pi∗C and pi
∗
R are optimal, then we have v̂
G
(x,y) = v
G
(x,y) (pi
∗
C , pi
∗
R). The main facts about the Γ
G
(x,y) games
are summarized in the following.
Theorem 4.4 For every graph G = (V,E) and every (x, y) ∈ V 2 the following hold.
1. For every (x, y) ∈ V 2, the game ΓG(x,y) has the value v̂
G
(x,y).
2. There exists a memoryless cop strategy pi∗C which is optimal for every game Γ
G
(x,y). For every ε > 0, there
exists a memoryless robber strategy piεR which is ε-optimal for every game Γ
G
(x,y).
3. V 2 can be partitioned into the sets V1 and V2 defined by
V1 =
{
(x, y) : v̂G(x,y) <∞
}
, V2 =
{
(x, y) : v̂G(x,y) =∞
}
.
4. If c (G) = 1, then V1 = V
2, i.e., v̂G(x,y) <∞ for every (x, y) ∈ V
2.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 follow immediately from the results of [6]. Part 3, the partition of V 2 into V1 and V2, is
just a definition. It remains to show part 4, i.e., that c (G) = 1⇒ V1 = V 2. This will also follow from [6] if we
can show the existence of a cop strategy pi#C and a constant MG such that
∀piR, x, y : v
G
(x,y)
(
pi#C , piR
)
≤MG <∞; (7)
in other words, pi#C guarantees finite (not necessarily optimal) capture time for every robber strategy and every
starting position.
The required pi#C is the strategy used in the proof of Lemma 3.3. Indeed, recall that
Ak =
{
s : s ∈ S˜∞ and R is still free after the first k · T rounds
}
and when C uses pi#C and R uses any piR we have
∞∑
k=1
Pr (Ak) ≤
∞∑
k=1
(
1−
(
1
n
)T)k
.
It follows that
∀piR : v
G
x0,y0
(
pi#C , piR
)
= E
(
∞∑
t=0
r (xt, yt)
)
≤
∞∑
k=1
k · T · Pr (Ak) ≤
∞∑
k=1
k · T ·
(
1−
(
1
n
)T)k
= M˜G,x,y <∞.
Letting MG = max(x,y)∈V 2 M˜G,x,y < ∞, where MG depends only on G, we see that pi
#
C satisfies (7) and the
proof is complete.
Remark 4.5 The theorem can be extended to the game ΓG,K(x,y) for any graph G (with any c˜ (G)), any number
of cops K and any initial position (x, y) (we will now have x ∈ V K). If K ≥ c˜ (G), then V1 = V K+1. Note
that the set V1 will never be empty; for example, when K = 1, (x, x) belongs to V1 for any c˜ (G) ∈ N (since
vG(x,x) (piC , piR) = 0 for any G, x, piC , piR).
Remark 4.6 Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the theorem can also be proved immediately using the results of either [5] or
[14].
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4.2 Computation of Value and Optimal Strategies
The value and optimal strategies of ΓG(x,y) can be computed by value iteration, as shown by Theorem 4.7. Before
presenting the theorem and its proof let us give its intuitive justification.
Suppose at time t the game position is (x, y). As already mentioned, we can assume that the “remainder
game” is ΓG(x,y), i.e., it can be played as a new CCCR game starting at (x, y); the remainder game has value
v̂G(x,y). Suppose further that C uses the move u and R uses the move v. The new game position is
(x′, y′) = Q˜ ((x′, y′) , u, v) ,
R receives
r (x′, y′) = r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
units from C and, invoking memorylessness again, the remainder-game is ΓG(x′,y′) = Γ
G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
and has value
v̂G(x′,y′) = v̂
G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
. To describe the relationship between v̂G(x,y) and v̂
G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
we need some new notation.
Recall that a finite two-person zero-sum game in normal form can be specified by a single M ×N matrix P
[19]. The game is played in a single round as follows: simultaneously the maximizing Player 1 chooses the row
index m and the minimizing Player 2 chooses the column index n; then Player 2 pays to Player 1 the amount
Amn. It is well known that every such game has a value and many algorithms are available to compute it. We
denote the game matrix A by the notation {Amn}
n=1,...,N
m=1,...,M and its value by Val
[
{Amn}
n=1,...,N
m=1,...,M
]
.
It seems reasonable (and can be rigorously justified) that ΓG(x,y) can be considered as a single-round finite
two-person zero-sum game as follows: when C chooses move u and R chooses move v the payoff to R is
r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
+ v̂G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
. (8)
In other words, R receives r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
units as the payoff of the current round and v̂G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
units
as the payoff of the “remainder-game” ΓG
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
(which is assumed to be played optimally by both players).
Hence the game matrix of ΓG(x,y) is
{
r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
+ v̂G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
}v∈V
u∈V
and has value
v̂G(x,y) = Val
[{
r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
+ v̂G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
}v∈V
u∈V
]
. (9)
Note that (9) holds when x 6= y; for x = y we obviously have v̂G(x,y) = 0.
The above is an informal argument for the connection between the values v̂G(x,y). The following theorem shows
that the argument can be made rigorous; furthermore, the theorem provides a method for computing the values,
as well as the optimal strategies.
Theorem 4.7 For every graph G = (V,E) with c˜ (G) = 1 and for every (x, y) ∈ V 2 the values
{
v̂G(x,y)
}
(x,y)∈V 2
are the smallest (componentwise) positive solution of the system of optimality equations:
v̂G(x,y) = Val
[{
r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
+ v̂G
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
}v∈V
u∈V
]
when x 6= y, (10)
v̂G(x,y) = 0 when x = y. (11)
Furthermore, for n = 0, 1, 2, ..., define the initial conditions
vG(x,y) (0) ≥ 0 when x 6= y and v
G
(x,y) (0) = 0, 0 when x = y
and, for n ∈ N, the recursion (value iteration)
vG(x,y) (n+ 1) = Val
[{
r
(
Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
)
+ vG
Q˜((x,y),u,v)
(n)
}v∈V
u∈V
]
when x 6= y, (12)
vG(x,y) (n+ 1) = 0 when x = y. (13)
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Then
∀ (x, y) ∈ V 2 : lim
n→∞
vG(x,y) (n) = v̂
G
(x,y).
Proof. This is essentially the combination of Theorems 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 from [5], but the following modifications
are required.
In [5] the optimality equations (10)-(11) and the recursion (12)-(13) are given in terms of transition prob-
abilities which in our notation would be written as P ((x′, y′) | (x, y) , u, v); this is the probability that the new
position is (x′, y′) given the old position is (x, y) and the player moves are u and v. However, in CCCR transitions
are deterministic, i.e.,
P ((x′, y′) | (x, y) , u, v) =
{
1 when (x′, y′) = Q˜ ((x, y) , u, v)
0 otherwise.
Furthermore, once the game reaches a capture position (x, x), it will always stay in this position, which has value
v̂G(x,x) = 0.
Taking the above in account, the optimality equations and the recursion of [5] reduce to (10)-(13).
Remark 4.8 The modification of the theorem theorem for the game ΓG,K(x,y), with K > 1, is obvious.
We conclude this section with some examples. We apply the value iteration (12)-(13) to several graphs and
discuss the results.
Example 4.9 In the first example G is a path of five nodes, as illustrated in Figure 4.9.
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 1: A five node path.
Let the (x, y) element of matrix V̂ G be equal to v̂G(x,y), the value of Γ
G
(x,y) when the cop is at node x and the
robber at node y. Value iteration yields
V̂ G =

0 4 4 4 4
1 0 3 3 3
2 2 0 2 2
3 3 3 0 1
4 4 4 4 0
 .
Cop and robber optimal strategies can be described quite easily: the cop should always move towards the robber
and the robber should always move away from the robber5. Clearly in this graph the CCCR time-optimal
strategies are the same as those for the TBCR game.
Example 4.10 Not surprisingly, for the tree G illustrated in Figure 4.10, the optimal cop and robber strategies
are again the same for the CCCR and TBCR games.
1
2 3
4 5
Figure 2: A tree.
5Actually the robber has several other optimal strategies; he can also stay in place if the cop is at a distance greater than one.
These are pure (i.e., deterministic) strategies; the robber also has mixed optimal strategies.
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The value-iteration algorithm yields
V̂ G =

0 1 2 2 2
3 0 3 3 3
2 2 0 1 1
3 3 3 0 2
3 3 3 2 0

Example 4.11 The next example involves the clique of three nodes, as illustrated in Figure 4.11.
1
2 3
Figure 3: A three node clique.
After eight iterations, the algorithm yields V
G
which is (componentwise) within 10−2 of the true solution
V̂ G =
 0 2 22 0 2
2 2 0
 .
The algorithm also yields the optimal strategies, which are symmetrical with respect to the cop and robber
positions (x0, y0). For example, when (x0, y0) = (3, 1) we have
pi∗C =
[
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
]
and pi∗C =
[
0,
1
2
,
1
2
]
.
In other words, under these strategies, both cop and robber always move with equal probability to one of the
two nodes they don’t currently occupy. It can be verified analytically that these strategies yield the previously
displayed value matrix V̂ G. Because of symmetry, many other optimal strategies exist for both cop and robber.
Example 4.12 The final example involves a Gavenciak graph [7], as illustrated in Figure 4.12.
1
2
3
4
5
6
78910
Figure 4: A Gavenciak graph.
From the results of [7] we know that the TBCR capture time of this graph is 7 (this is the minimax of the capture
time over all initial positions). The cop is able to achieve this capture time by first maneuvering himself to node
7 and forcing the robber into the path subgraph, and then chasing the robber all the way to node 10. In the
CCCR game the results are similar but they require the use of randomized strategies. We do not present the
entire V̂ G (because of space limitations) but let us give some indicative results. For example, when the initial
positions are (x0, y0) = (2, 1), the cop cannot be certain of capturing the robber in one move (since the moves
are simultaneous). It turns out that, by the application of randomized strategies, the optimal expected capture
time is v̂G2,1
∼= 18.82... . However, the part of the strategies which concerns the path subgraph is, as in TBCR,
deterministic. For inctance once the cop reaches node 8 (with the robber in either node 9 or 10) he should
deterministically perform the transitions 8→ 9→ 10. Let us also note that for this ten-nodes graph, the value
iteration algorithm required 90 iterations to get (componentwise) within 10−2 of the true solution.
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5 Related Work
While the assumption of simultaneous moves is a natural one (and is better than turn-based movement as a
model of real world pursuit / evasion problems) it appears that CCCR has not been studied in the cops and
robber literature. However, our analysis of time optimal CCCR strategies follows closely the corresponding study
of time optioimal TBCR strategies presented in [8] (and expanded in [4]). Both Hahn’s algorithm in [8] and the
recursion (12) of Theorem 4.7 are value iteration algorithms. The main difference between the two is this: while
in Hahn’s algorithm updating the value in every iteration only requires taking a minimum or a maximum, every
value iteration of (12) requires solving a one-round, zero-sum game (this is indicated by the Val [·] operator in
(12)). Consequently, (12) is computationally more intensive than Hahn’s algorithm.
As already mentioned, simultaneous moves have not been explored in the CR literature. On the other hand,
an interesting analog can be found in the literature of reachability games [2, 15]. As we have pointed out in
[12, 13], TBCR is a special case of a “classical” (i.e., turn-based) reachability game. Similarly, CCCR is a special
case of a concurrent reachability game6. The literature on concurrent reachability games [1] can furnish useful
insights for the analysis of CCCR.
All the above problems can be considered as special cases of the general stochastic game. The book [5] is an
excellent, comprehensive and relatively recent study of the topic; it also contains many references to important
earlier work.
6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude this paper by presenting questions which, in our opinion, merit further study.
One group of questions concern the definition of cop number, which in turn depends on the definition of the
properties of the capture event. To understand the issue, we must turn back to concurrent reachability games.
Let A be the set of all histories of a reachability game and B ⊆ A the set of all realizations in which the target
state is reached (in CCCR, B would be the set of all infinite histories {(xt, yt)}
∞
t=0 for which there is some tc
such that xtc = ytc). As pointed out in [1], the target state can be reached in at least three different senses (and
each of these implies the next one in the list).
1. Sure reachability: B = A.
2. Almost sure reachability: Pr (B) = 1.
3. Limit sure reachability: For every real ε, player 1 has a strategy such that for all strategies of player 2, the
target state is reached with probability greater than 1− ε.
The above carry over to CCCR and can be used to define corresponding cop numbers: csure (G), calmostsure (G)
and climitsure (G). In this paper we have worked exclusively with c˜ (G) = calmostsure (G). Obviously
csure (G) ≥ calmostsure (G) ≥ climitsure (G)
but several additional questions can be asked. For example can the ratios csure(G)
calmostsure(G)
and csure(G)
climit−sure(G)
be
bounded by a constant? By a number depending on the size of G? How about the differences csure (G) −
calmostsure (G) and calmostsure (G)− climitsure (G)?
Another group of questions concerns the CCCR variants obtained by modifying the cop’s and/or the robber’s
behavior.
1. For example, what is the cost of drunkenness? In other words, what is the ratio of expected capture times
for the previously descibed CCCR game and a variant in which the robber performs a random walk on the
nodes of the graph? The same question has been studied for the TBCR case in [10, 11]
2. Similarly, what is the cost of visibility? In this case we study the ratio of expected capture times for the
previously descibed CCCR game and a variant in which the robber is invisible to the cop. For the TBCR
case, this has been studied in [11, 12]
6This is the source of our term “concurrent CR game”.
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